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Abstract
Motivated by the observation that among OECD countries redistribution is neg-
atively correlated with entrepreneurial activity, we examine the implications of en-
trepreneurial financial frictions for optimal linear capital taxation, in a setting where
the government is concerned with redistribution. By including financial frictions,
we emphasize the effect of a new channel affecting the equity-efficiency trade-off of
redistribution: taxes affect the allocative efficiency of capital and, ultimately, total
factor productivity. We find that high tax rates are optimal, provided that they are
applied to wealth, rather than risky capital. Under plausible parameter values, we
find that the optimal tax on risky capital is lower than that on wealth, and roughly
in line with current U.S. levels. This suggests welfare gains from taxing wealth at a
higher rate than risky capital.
1 Introduction
Guvenen et al. (2017) – I just put a random citation here so that this would compile
2 Model
In this section we describe the economic environment in detail and present the model
assumptions.
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2.1 Environment
There is a continuum of two types of households: entrepreneurs and workers. In ad-
dition, there is a continuum of competitive final goods producers, and a continuum
of competitive financial intermediaries. Entrepreneurs own capital, while workers live
hand to mouth and supply inelastic labor. Entrepreneurs invest some of their capital in
risky projects, which yield a stochastic amount of an intermediate good, and lease the
rest of their capital directly to final goods producers. Entrepreneurs may convert the in-
termediate goods they produce directly into units of final output, or may sell them to the
final goods producers. Final goods producers produce output using labor, capital and in-
termediate goods. Financial intermediaries allocate finance between entrepreneurs. The
government levies (possibly negative) taxes on the agents and funds the fixed (exoge-
nously given) level of government spending G. – must change this sentence to account
for gov’t being able to borrow.
Timing Time is infinite. Workers and final goods producers are infinitely lived. En-
trepreneurs die at the end of each period with probability γ ∈ (0, 1) and their capital is
equally distributed among a γ measure of newly born entrepreneurs. Financial interme-
diaries live for one period and in each period new intermediaries are born. Every period
is divided into three sub-periods: morning, afternoon and evening. In the morning,
entrepreneurs buy and sell capital amongst themselves through financial intermediaries
and each entrepreneur devotes some of her own capital to her own risky project. We will
refer to this as risky investment. She leases the rest of her capital to the competitive final
goods firms. We will refer to this as risk-free capital investment. In the afternoon, each
entrepreneur draws an idiosyncratic shock which will affect the intermediate goods pro-
duced by her risky project. In the evening, entrepreneurs either convert the intermediate
goods they produce into units of final output or sell them to the final goods firms, and
workers are employed by these firms.1 Output of the final good is produced. Financial
intermediaries die, and then entrepreneurs divide their remaining resources between
consumption and investment.
Technology An entrepreneur i starts the period with kit units of capital. We assume
that there exists some k > 0 such that all entrepreneurs have an initial capital at least
equal to k.Do we still need this? Does this mean that we must restrict k’ to be greater
than k? Entrepreneurs vary in their entrepreneurial ability. At the start of each period,
before capital is traded, entrepreneur i draws publicly observable ability θit ∈ [θ, θ],
which affects the productivity of her risky project. The draw of θ is correlated over time
and all entrepreneurs draw from an identical distribution, with cdf G(θ) = A0 − A1θ
1As we discuss below, the quantity of intermediate output that entrepreneurs convert directly into final
output is unobserved by others. This technology, which allows entrepreneurs to secretly divert resources
for personal use, represents the ability of firm managers to divert firms’ funds for personal use in reality.
This creates a financial market friction.
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and associated pdf g (θ).2 The constants A0 and A1 are chosen so that G(θ) = 0 and
G(θ) = 1.3 We refer to θit as the entrepreneur’s ‘type’. If an entrepreneur with type θit
invests kEit in her private project in the morning, then in the afternoon the project yields a
number of units of intermediate goods equal to yEit = eitθitk
E
it, where eit is an idiosyncratic
productivity shock distributed according to the cumulative distribution function H(e),
with probability distribution function h(e). We assume that h(0) > 0, h(e) = 0 for all
e < 0, h(·) is continuously differentiable for e > 0, E (e) = 1 and, for all v ≥ 1 and
x ≥ 0, ∂2
∂x2
( ∫
e(1+xe)
−vh(e)de∫
e(1+xe)
−veh(e)de
)
≥ 0.4
Any capital of the entrepreneur’s which she does not invest in her risky project,
she leases to the final goods producer directly. Let kFit be the amount leased to the
final goods producer. Note that, for entrepreneur i, kEit + k
F
it is not equal to kit, because
entrepreneurs sell capital among themselves in the morning of each period. In addition
to selling intermediate goods to the final goods producer, the entrepreneur can convert
them directly into units of final output. If she does this, she can convert one unit of the
intermediate good into ρ ∈ (0, 1) units of the final good.
We assume that the final goods producer buys intermediate goods from the en-
trepreneur at price rEt per unit, and rents capital from the entrepreneur directly at rental
rate rFt per unit. The final goods producer also hires workers at wage rate wt. The
representative final goods producer produces final output according to the production
function:
Yt = F
(
YEt ,K
F
t , N
)
,
where Yt is the aggregate final output, N is aggregate labor, YEt is aggregate input of the
intermediate good and KFt is aggregate capital leased directly to the final goods producer.
As is standard, we assume that F is concave and increasing in all arguments and that for
each factor i ∈ {YEt ,KFt , N}: limi→0 Fi = ∞ and F = 0 at i = 0. Furthermore, we assume
that limN→∞ FN = 0, and limKFt→∞ FKFt = 0. However, in contrast to the standard Inada
conditions, we assume that limYEt →∞ FYEt > ρ > 0.
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The device of having a final goods producer that uses some intermediate goods and
some capital goods directly is a simple way to allow entrepreneurs to choose between
2The assumption that an entrepreneur’s type is independent of her initial capital appears quite restric-
tive. Its practical applicability may be greater, however, if we interpret kit as the number of efficiency units
of capital that the entrepreneur entered the period with, and imagine that this is commonly observed. θit
then refers to a shock that the entrepreneur receives, which does not depend on the initial quantity of
efficiency units of capital she posseses.
3The distributional assumptions on G imply that the distribution of entrepreneurial ability resembles
a Pareto distribution, except for the upper bound θ. That ability has an upper bound is essential in our
setting, because it can readily be shown that the financial friction will cease to be relevant if there are types
with sufficiently high θ. Pareto distributions with a parameter close to 2 are common in the literature.
4Numerically, we find that the latter assumption holds for many distributions with non-negative sup-
port: exponential, lognormal, Pareto, generalized Pareto, gamma and chi-square.
5This assumption is to guarantee that entrepreneurs will all use their private projects to produce inter-
mediate goods in any constrained efficient allocation.
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investing capital in a risky way (the private project) or risk-free way (leasing it directly
to the final goods producer). This is designed to capture the idea that some investment
projects are more risky than others and that capital owners must take into account the
risks associated with different projects when making investment decisions.
Preferences Workers have a constant labor endowment N = 1 which they supply
inelastically. Entrepreneurs do not work. Entrepreneurial consumption is denoted Cit
and workers’ consumption is denoted ct. The period utility of entrepreneur i is u (Cit) =
C1−σit
1−σ or u (Cit) = log(Cit) in the event σ = 1. We assume σ ≥ 1.6 The period utility of
workers is u (ct), i.e. the same utility function as entrepreneurs.
Government Must change the government tab to account for gov’t borrowing The
government taxes the undepreciated part of capital at the end of the period at tax rate
τW , where capital depreciates at rate δ. The government taxes intermediate goods that
are sold to the final goods firm at tax rate τE and taxes capital leased directly to the final
goods firm at tax rate τF. It is assumed that the government is unable to tax intermediate
goods that are converted directly into consumption by the entrepreneurs.7 It taxes labor
at rate τN. Any of these tax rates can be negative.
The government has to finance exogenous expenditure G, and must balance its bud-
get. Taxes are paid in the evening and government spending also takes place in the
evening. The government is not allowed to trade in financial assets at any time. This
implies the following government budget constraint in the evening:
G = wτN + τErEYE + τFrFKF + τW(1− δ)K (1)
Financial Markets and Budget Constraints Workers live hand to mouth. Thus, ag-
gregate worker consumption and labor supply satisfy:
ct = wt(1− τN) (2)
N = 1. (3)
Entrepreneurs may fund capital purchases in the morning by selling financial claims
on the return of that capital. These claims are bought by risk neutral perfectly competi-
tive financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries make zero profits in equilibrium.8
6Aspects of the model solution jump discontinuously when σ < 1, because if entrepreneurs are suf-
ficiently close to risk neutral they will not seek to avoid zero consumption. σ ≥ 1 represents the typical
case assumed in calibrated macroeconomic models.
7As discussed below, the conversion of intermediate goods directly into consumption is privately ob-
served by the entrepreneur, and so the government cannot tax this. This may also be viewed as represent-
ing the possibility of tax evasion on the part of entrepreneurs.
8Since financial intermediaries make zero profits, it makes no difference to the equilibrium behavior
of the economy who owns the banks. We may assume that they are owned either by workers or by
entrepreneurs.
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Financial intermediaries raise the funds to buy these financial claims by issuing bonds
to other entrepreneurs.9 We refer to an entrepreneur as a borrower if she sells financial
claims to the financial intermediary in the morning in order to invest, and a saver if she
instead buys bonds.
Let bt(k, θ) denote the amount this entrepreneur obtains in the morning by selling
financial claims. This is positive if the entrepreneur is a borrower in the morning and
negative if the entrepreneur is a saver. Let kEt (k, θ) denote the level of capital the en-
trepreneur born with endowment k and type θ invests in her own business, and let
kFt (k, θ) denote the level of capital she invests in the risk-free sector. None of these ob-
jects depend on e because e is not revealed until the afternoon. Therefore, in the morning
the budget constraint of an entrepreneur is:
kEt (k, θ) + k
F
t (k, θ) = kt + bt(k, θ). (4)
Let Ct(k, θ, e) and It(k, θ, e) be the consumption and investment of an entrepreneur,
which depend not only on initial capital k and entrepreneurial type θ, but also on the
productivity realization e. Let bˆt(k, θ, e) denote the amount the entrepreneur pays in the
evening to the financial intermediaries that bought financial claims in the morning. This
will be negative if the entrepreneur was a saver in the morning. Let yEt (k, θ, e) denote the
total amount of intermediate goods sold to the final goods producer by the entrepreneur.
Given the assumptions about financial markets, the budget constraint of an entrepreneur
in the evening is:
Ct(k, θ, e) + (1+ τI) It(k, θ, e) + bˆt(k, θ, e) = (1− τE)rEt yEt (k, θ, e) + ρ
(
θekEt (k, θ)− yEt (k, θ, e)
)
+rFt (1− τF) kFt (k, θ)− τW (1− δ)
(
kEt (k, θ) + k
F
t (k, θ)
)
, (5)
where
It(k, θ, e) = kt+1(k, θ, e)− (1− δ)
(
kEt (k, θ) + k
F
t (k, θ)
)
(6)
and yEt (k, θ, e) satisfies:
yEt (k, θ, e) ≤ θekEt (k, θ), (7)
Note that an entrepreneur who sells all her units of intermediate goods to the fi-
nal goods producer receives after-tax income (1− τE)θerEt from doing so, and an en-
trepreneur who converts them directly into units of final output secures after-tax income
θeρ from this.
Recall that the entrepreneur decides how to divide resources between consumption
9The role of intermediaries is for mathematical convenience. Simply allowing the entrepreneurs to
trade financial claims among themselves would suffice. In that sense the intermediaries are no more
essential to the model than are the competitive final goods producers.
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and investment at the end of the period, after the financial intermediary is dead. This
means the latter has no influence on this decision. Let zt (k, θ, e) denote the “cash on
hand” that the entrepreneur has at the end of the period to spend on consumption and
investment. Combining (5) and (6), the budget constraint of the entrepreneur in the
evening can be rewritten as:
zt (k, θ, e) = Ct(k, θ, e) + (1+ τI) kt+1(k, θ, e) (8)
zt(k, θ, e) + bˆt(k, θ, e) = (1− τE)rEt yEt (k, θ, e) + ρ
(
θekEt (k, θ)− yEt (k, θ, e)
)
+ rFt (1− τF) kFt (k, θ) + (1− τW) (1− δ)
(
kEt (k, θ) + k
F
t (k, θ)
)
.(9)
The value of zt (k, θ, e) is specified by the entrepreneur’s contract with the financial in-
termediary, which we describe shortly.
Financial contract An entrepreneur’s realization of e, her output of intermediate
goods, the quantity of intermediate goods she converts directly into consumption and
her consumption are all private information. In particular, after observing the shock e,
an entrepreneur can choose to honestly report her output of intermediate goods, but
she can also lie by under-reporting the quantity of intermediate goods she produces
and converting more intermediate goods directly into final output than she admits to.
The quantity of intermediate goods the entrepreneur sells to the final goods producer is
public information however.10
When selling financial claims in the morning, the market will expect the entrepreneur
to repay bˆt(k, θ, e) in the evening, given e. In equilibrium, the market must be correct
in expecting this, and so the entrepreneur must have an incentive to repay this amount,
rather than lying about e and repaying too little. Therefore, it is without loss of generality
to restrict attention to contracts where the entrepreneur honestly reports her e, and pays
the promised amount bˆt(k, θ, e). Such a contract is only incentive compatible if it is
optimal for the entrepreneur to report e honestly, rather than lying by reporting some
eˆ 6= e and converting more intermediate goods directly into final output. This gives rise
to the following incentive compatibility constraint:
∂zt (k, θ, e)
∂e
= ρθkEt (k, θ) (10)
for any (k, θ, e). I’m not sure how to interpret this given that up to hear we haven’t set
up the value functions in the infinite horizon notes. Also, in the slides you haven’t set
the problem in terms of z so this constraint looks different there. I like the z notation
because it makes it clear that consumption-investment happens after the bank is dead.
The additional constraint that the entrepreneur faces in selling financial claims to the
10In the extreme case ρ = 0 there would be no informational friction, since the entrepreneur has no
incentive to convert intermediate goods directly into consumption.
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financial intermediaries is the participation constraint of the intermediaries. Specifically,
financial intermediaries will only buy financial claims sold by the entrepreneur if these
claims receive at least (1− τF) rFt + (1− δ) (1− τW) return in the evening in expectation,
where (1− τF) rFt + (1− δ) (1− τW) is the market risk-free rate, which is equal to the
post-tax return on capital that is leased directly to the final goods firms. This implies the
following constraint:∫
e
bˆt (k, θ, e) h (e)de ≥
[
(1− τF)rFt + (1− δ)(1− τW)
]
bt (k, θ) . (11)
Since there is perfect competition between the (risk-neutral) financial intermediaries,
the entrepreneur will be able to sell any financial claims she issues, provided the incen-
tive compatibility constraint and equation (11) are satisfied. Therefore, the entrepreneur
can choose bt(·) and bˆt(·) to maximize her expected utility, subject to these constraints.
This implies that the bank participation constraint will bind with equality.
Entrepreneur’s Optimization Problem Let Vt (k, θ) denote the value function in the
morning for an entrepreneur with capital k and ability θ, and let V˜t (z, θ) denote the
value function in the evening of an entrepreneur with cash on hand z and ability θ who
is yet to choose between consumption and investment. Then Vt (k, θ) and V˜t (z, θ) evolve
according to the following Bellman equations:
V˜t (z, θ) = max
C
u (C) + β (1− γ)Eθ′
(
Vt+1
(
z− C
1+ τI
, θ′
)
|θ
)
(12)
Vt (k, θ) = Ee
(
V˜t (z, θ)
)
(13)
where the equation (12) uses the budget constraint (8) and the 1− γ reflects the proba-
bility that the entrepreneur may die. Substituting (13) into (12) we obtain:
V˜t (z, θ) = max
C
u (C) + β (1− γ)Eθ′,e
(
V˜t+1
(
z′, θ′
) |θ) (14)
where z′ = z
(
θ′, z−C1+τI , e
′
)
. Then, the entrepreneur writes a contract with the financial
intermediary aiming to maximize her expected end of period value. That is, the opti-
mal financial contract specifies
{
zt(k, θ, e), kEt (k, θ), k
F
t (k, θ), bt (k, θ) , bˆt(k, θ, e), y
E
t (k, θ, e)
}
which solve
sup
∫
e
V˜(z(k, θ, e), θ,X)h (e)de (15)
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subject to
kEt (k, θ) + k
F
t (k, θ) = kt + bt(k, θ) (16)
zt(k, θ, e) + bˆt(k, θ, e) = (1− τE)rEt yEt (k, θ, e) + ρ
(
θekEt (k, θ)− yEt (k, θ, e)
)
+ rFt (1− τF) kFt (k, θ) + (1− τW) (1− δ)
(
kEt (k, θ) + k
F
t (k, θ)
)
(17)∫
e
bˆt (k, θ, e) h (e)de ≥
[
(1− τF)rFt + (1− δ)(1− τW)
]
bt (k, θ) (18)
kEt (k, θ) ≥ 0 (19)
yEt (k, θ, e) ∈ [0, θekEt (k, θ, e)] (20)
zt(k, θ, e) ≥ 0 (21)
∂zt(k, θ, e)
∂e
= ρkEt (k, θ)θ. (22)
After financial intermediaries die, the entrepreneur chooses {Ct(k, θ, e), kt+1(k, θ, e)} to
maximize (14) subject to (8).
Market clearing The labor and asset market clearing conditions are:
N = 1 (23)∫
i
bt(kit, θit)di = 0 (24)∫
i
bˆt(kit, θit, eit)di = 0. (25)
where kit denotes the initial capital of entrepreneur i, and θit and eit denote the values
of θ and e drawn by entrepreneur i in period t. In fact, since eit is an i.i.d. draw for
each entrepreneur i, equation (25) can be shown to follow from (24) and (11), so it is
redundant.
The capital market must clear in the morning of each period:
Kt = KEt + K
F
t , (26)
where KEt denotes total capital invested in entrepreneurs’ private projects, and K
F
t is total
capital in the risk-free sector. These are given, respectively, by:
KEt =
∫
i
kEt (kit, θit)di (27)
KFt =
∫
i
(kit − bt(kit, θit)− kE(kit, θit))di. (28)
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and the goods market clearing condition then follows by Walras’ law:11∫
i
C(kit, θit, ei)di+ ct + G = F
(
YEt ,K
F
t , 1
)
+ (1− δ)
(
KEt + K
F
t
)
,
Check for changes due to gov’t borrowing where the total amount of intermediate goods
sold to the final goods producer, YEt , is given by:
YEt =
∫
i
yEt (kit, θit, eit)di. (29)
The first order conditions of the representative final goods producer imply that the
(before tax) returns on capital and wage rate are given by:
rEt = F1
(
YEt ,K
F
t , N
)
(30)
rFt = F2
(
YEt ,K
F
t , N
)
(31)
wt = F3
(
YEt ,K
F
t , N
)
. (32)
Equilibrium Definition For given tax rates {τW , τE, τF, τN}, an equilibrium E of this
economy is a set of (non-negative) prices
{
rEt , r
F
t ,wt
}
and decision rules for the en-
trepreneurs
{
Ct(k, θ, e), kt+1(k, θ, e), zt(k, θ, e), kEt (k, θ), k
F
t (k, θ), bt (k, θ) , bˆt(k, θ, e), y
E
t (k, θ, e)
}
and for the workers c, and (non-negative) aggregate quantities KFt ,Y
E
t , N, such that:
1. The Government’s budget constraint (1) is balanced,must be changed to account
for gov’t borrowing
2. Worker consumption and labor supply satisfy (2) and (3),
3. Entrepreneurs’ decision rules are given by the solution to the entrepreneur’s prob-
lem in (14) and (15),
4. KFt and Y
E
t are the aggregate of entrepreneurs’ decisions, given by (28) and (29),
5. Returns of capital rEt and r
F
t , and wages wt are determined by the first order con-
ditions of the final goods producers (30)-(32).
11In particular, the goods market clearing condition can be obtained by summing the budget constraints
of workers, entrepreneurs and government, substituting the other market clearing conditions and using
that F displays constant returns to scale.
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